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Article
“No man is an island, entire of itself, every man is a piece of the 
continent, a part of the main.”
—John Donne
Humans are social beings. It is important to belong to groups 
to fulfill the basic needs for safety, survival, and reproduc-
tion (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The extent to which an 
individual attaches affective significance to a group she or he 
belongs to is defined as social identification. Social identifi-
cation shapes social perceptions, feelings, and behaviors 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Those who identify highly with their 
ingroup think of themselves in terms of their group member-
ship, feel close to the group, are committed to the group, and 
act on behalf of the group (e.g., H. J. Smith & Tyler, 1997; 
Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; van Zomeren, Leach, & 
Spears, 2012). As such, people’s social identification is psy-
chologically relevant and socially consequential. It is an 
indispensable construct in almost all research on intragroup 
and intergroup dynamics (see for overviews Ellemers, 
Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Haslam, van Knippenberg, Platow, 
& Ellemers, 2003; Jetten, Haslam, & Haslam, 2012).
Considering the large body of research on social identi-
fication, particularly on its consequences for social-psycho-
logical functioning, it is quite remarkable that there is little 
insight in the antecedents of social identification. What 
processes explain group members’ level of social identifi-
cation? Currently, our understanding of the intraindividual 
mechanisms that determine social identification levels is 
still limited. Specifically, there is a lack of integrative mod-
els providing insights into the cognitive processes through 
which people come to attach significance to their ingroups. 
In this review, we introduce such model: We provide a 
framework in which we propose that there are two cogni-
tive pathways that complement each other in explaining 
how people identify with groups, namely, self-stereotyping 
and self-anchoring. We integrate the pathways in the 
Integrative Model of Social Identification (IMSI). We will 
show that such model offers a new, dynamic, and fine-
grained understanding of how individuals in different 
groups identify via different cognitive pathways.
We start from the assumption that social identification is 
grounded in the cognitive integration of the ingroup into the 
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self-concept. Our self-concept represents “who we are.” It is 
formed by both our personal dispositions, goals, and values 
(personal self), as well as by our group memberships (social 
self; e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For example, when some-
one asks you “Who are you?,” you will probably disclose 
some of your personal attributes (e.g., organized, extra-
verted) as well as some of your group memberships (e.g., 
sports club, profession). In essence, the groups we belong to 
are inextricably linked to our self-concepts and vice versa (E. 
R. Smith & Henry, 1996). The more people perceive mental 
overlap between the self and an ingroup, the higher their 
social identification levels (Cadinu & De Amicis, 1999; 
Coats, Smith, Claypool, & Banner, 2000; Tropp & Wright, 
2001). This implies that understanding how mental overlap 
between the self and the group emerges is crucial to under-
standing how people identify with groups. Where does self–
group overlap come from? Am I like the group or is the group 
like me?
The Traditional Cognitive Pathway to 
Social Identification
Following the “I am like my group” rhetoric, Self-
Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, 
& Wetherell, 1987) states that mental overlap between self 
and group emerges top-down, via the assimilation of the self 
to an ingroup’s prototype. This process is called self- 
stereotyping. To illustrate this process, imagine Ron, a die-
hard football fan. He dresses in the typical colors of the foot-
ball team and behaves fanatically at the stadium on behalf of 
his team. Clearly, Ron is highly assimilated with the football 
team’s prototypical features. In fact, who he is in terms of his 
personality (i.e., introverted, organized, sweet tooth) is irrel-
evant. More generally stated, SCT proposes that an individu-
al’s personal self (a person’s unique characteristics) and a 
social self (prototypical group characteristics) exist at oppo-
site ends of the same continuum. When the social self is 
salient, the personal self shifts to the background or deper-
sonalizes, and ingroup members start to define themselves in 
accordance with prototypical group characteristics.
To date, research and theorizing on social identification 
are firmly grounded in self-stereotyping principles. 
According to SCT, social identification emerges solely via 
the social self: the higher the assimilation to a group’s proto-
type, the higher the social identification (Turner et al., 1987; 
Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Without casting 
doubt on the relevance of self-stereotyping, we believe that a 
mere focus on this process is insufficient and somewhat one-
sided to explain social identification. In particular, the dis-
continuity between people’s personal and social self that is 
assumed with self-stereotyping implies that people’s level of 
identification is irreconcilable with individuality in the 
group: As people come to perceive themselves as inter-
changeable exemplars of a group’s prototype, their self-con-
cepts become depersonalized (Onorato & Turner, 2004). 
However, to fully understand how people identify with 
groups and integrate a social identity into the self-concept, 
we believe that the personal self may not, and cannot, always 
be negligible.
To illustrate this, consider that self-stereotyping is a 
highly context-dependent, short-term process. How we self-
define (i.e., what social self is activated) depends on the par-
ticular intergroup context that is salient at that moment. As 
such, self-stereotyping explains how we identify in response 
to short-term changes in the intergroup context (e.g., Turner 
et al., 1994). Yet, a longitudinal perspective on how individu-
als identify with groups and how ingroups become integrated 
parts of our self-concepts is not incorporated into this per-
spective (see also Amiot, de la Sablonniere, Terry, & Smith, 
2007). Also, we take our unique dispositions with us across 
different contexts and when joining new groups (cf. Deaux, 
1993). This is not taken into account when relying solely on 
self-stereotyping to explain social identification levels. In 
addition, self-stereotyping requires the availability of clear 
group prototypes for people to assimilate to. However, in 
today’s societies, groups are often complex, diverse, or 
ambiguously defined (e.g., Crisp & Meleady, 2012). For 
example, think of the complexity of the European Union, 
diversity in large international companies, or virtual reality 
in computer-based groups. In these groups, a shared percep-
tion of the group prototype is likely absent or vague. What 
constitutes the social self in these groups? And, if not solely 
via self-stereotyping, how does social identification emerge?
A New Cognitive Pathway to Social 
Identification
The examples above indicate the need for a more elaborate 
and inclusive understanding of how people identify with 
groups than a mere reliance on self-stereotyping. We argue 
that in situations described above, the personal self is crucial 
to shape self–group overlap. Building from this argument, 
research has shown that there is yet another way to create a 
mental bond between the self and the ingroup, namely, via 
self-anchoring.1 Self-anchoring is the opposite process from 
self-stereotyping; information about the personal self-con-
cept is used as an anchor to define an ingroup (Cadinu & 
Rothbart, 1996). To illustrate this, imagine Mark, a new-
comer in an organization. He considers himself to be cre-
ative. Because Mark is unfamiliar with the organization’s 
prototype, he creates a mental bond with the organization by 
generalizing his creative self to the group. This results in 
overlap between the self and the ingroup, so that Mark views 
the organization as creative too. Thus, with self-anchoring, 
the personal self plays a central role in shaping self–group 
overlap. Presumably, the perception that “the group is like 
me” forms an important additional piece of the puzzle to 
understand how people identify with groups. Therefore, we 
propose that the cognitive basis for social identification lies 
within the self—both the social and the personal self.
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Self-anchoring and self-stereotyping are well-established 
concepts in social-psychological literature. Both account for 
emergence of cognitive self–group overlap, yet the starting 
point for this overlap differs. Considering their close rela-
tionship, it is remarkable that there is little research investi-
gating self-stereotyping and self-anchoring simultaneously. 
Studies by Otten and Epstude (2006) and Cho and Knowles 
(2013) are exceptions to this. Both focused on a methodol-
ogy to integrate self-anchoring and self-stereotyping mea-
sures. However, these studies do not provide theoretical 
understanding on the consequences of such integration for 
group functioning, and particularly social identification. 
There is some support for a self-stereotyping and social iden-
tification link (e.g., Latrofa, Vaes, Cadinu, & Carnaghi, 
2010; Spears et al., 1997; Verkuyten & Nekuee, 1999), but 
overall, empirical evidence is scarce. Moreover, the idea that 
self-anchoring could be relevant to social identification has 
only recently been introduced in the literature (Van Veelen, 
Otten, & Hansen, 2011). Yet, it may be precisely this process 
that, in addition to self-stereotyping, enriches current theo-
rizing on social identification and offers insight into how 
people identify with groups in which similarity and proto-
typicality do not, or cannot, form the cornerstone of group 
membership.
Our aim is to integrate self-anchoring and self-stereotyp-
ing in one research model and demonstrate that both pro-
cesses form two distinct, but complementary, pathways to 
explain how people identify with groups. To achieve such 
integration, we need to overcome some theoretical and meth-
odological challenges. Specifically, self-stereotyping and 
self-anchoring stem from different research traditions, with 
self-stereotyping rooted in Social Identity Theory (SIT; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-anchoring rooted in research 
on social judgment and bias (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). 
This has led to contrasting theoretical viewpoints on the pri-
macy of the person or the social context as the basis for social 
inference (e.g., DiDonato, Ullrich, & Krueger, 2011; 
Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, Crisp, & Redersdorff, 2006; 
Karniol, 2003; Mussweiler, 2003). Moreover, in these sepa-
rate research traditions, scholars have used a wide variety of 
measures to tap into the same social inference process. Such 
measurement inconsistency obscures construct validity, and 
also poses a great challenge on integration and comparison 
of self-anchoring and self-stereotyping in one research 
model.
In this review, we first provide a brief overview on self-
stereotyping and self-anchoring literature. Second, we will 
discuss the theoretical and methodological barriers that may 
have formed obstacles to the joint investigation of self-
anchoring and self-stereotyping and provide solutions to 
overcome them. Next, we will introduce the IMSI and dis-
cuss the basic premises and empirical evidence so far. 
Finally, we apply the model to different group situations and 
individuals, and demonstrate that in some social situations 
assimilation to group prototypes may work best, whereas in 
other situations relying on the personal self may work best 
to shape a group bond.
Background Self-Stereotyping and Self-
Anchoring
Self-Stereotyping
Building on SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), SCT (Turner et al., 
1987) provides a cognitive framework on how people form a 
connection between the self and the ingroup: People belong 
to groups to the extent that they define, describe, and evalu-
ate themselves in terms of the group prototype, and apply 
ingroup norms and values onto the self (self-stereotyping). 
After its theoretical establishment, many empirical studies 
focused on self-stereotyping. Without claiming to be exhaus-
tive, we will give some prominent examples.
Evidence was obtained that the tendency to self-stereo-
type is stronger when an intergroup context is salient com-
pared with when an intragroup context is salient (Hogg & 
Turner, 1987). Similarly, self-stereotyping was shown to be 
stronger when a social identity is salient as compared with 
when a personal identity is salient (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991; 
Onorato & Turner, 2004). Moreover, minority or low-status 
ingroup members were found to self-stereotype more 
strongly than majority or high-status members (Cadinu, 
Latrofa, & Carnaghi, 2013; Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 
2002; Simon & Hamilton, 1994; Spears et al., 1997), because 
the ingroup identity is especially salient and important to the 
self-concept for members of minority or low-status groups 
(Latrofa et al., 2010). Indeed, research demonstrated that cat-
egory salience (Hundhammer & Mussweiler, 2012; 
Verkuyten & Nekuee, 1999) and meaningfulness of the 
social category (Simon, Hastedt, & Aufderheide, 1997) are 
positive predictors of self-stereotyping. Furthermore, 
although previous research revealed that self-stereotyping is 
only present regarding positive ingroup stereotypes (i.e., 
selective self-stereotyping; Biernat, Vescio, & Green, 1996), 
later research showed that low-status group members attri-
bute both positive and negative group stereotypes to the self 
(Latrofa, Vaes, Pastore, & Cadinu, 2009) and that negative 
self-stereotyping is also present using implicit measures 
(Lun, Sinclair, & Cogburn, 2009).
Aside from antecedents, self-stereotyping also has rele-
vant consequences. For example, self-stereotyping serves a 
protective function for group members’ well-being in 
response to intergroup threat (Branscombe, Schmitt, & 
Harvey, 1999; Latrofa, Vaes, & Cadinu, 2012; Latrofa et al., 
2009). Also, self-stereotyping has been related to system jus-
tification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), such that in a situation 
of status inequality, self-stereotyping serves to legitimize the 
hierarchical system and to perceive it as fair (Laurin, Kay, & 
Shepherd, 2011). Moreover, a domain that has especially 
received research attention is the impact of self-stereotyping 
on ingroup favoritism (e.g., Pickett et al., 2002; Voci, 2006).
 at Universiteit Twente on February 11, 2016psr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
6 Personality and Social Psychology Review 20(1)
Following SIT, people are motivated to achieve and main-
tain positive ingroup identities (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998), 
which can be achieved by favorable comparisons with out-
groups. According to Sedikides and Strube (1997), this moti-
vation is driven by an innate human need for self-enhancement 
and self-esteem. At the same time, SCT assumes that when a 
certain ingroup becomes salient, people define themselves in 
terms of the attributes of this ingroup (self-stereotyping; 
Turner et al., 1987): What is defined as “we” defines “me.” 
Taken together, it is assumed that in salient intergroup con-
texts, ingroup favoritism, that is, a positive bias toward the 
ingroup relative to outgroups, emerges via self-stereotyping 
(Abrams & Hogg, 1988) to fulfill self-enhancement needs 
(Hogg & Abrams, 1990).
Importantly, ingroup favoritism is a remarkably reliable 
phenomenon (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002) that 
emerges under the most minimal laboratory conditions. 
People who are randomly and anonymously categorized into 
one of two meaningless groups on the basis of some trivial 
criterion favor their ingroup over the outgroup (Rabbie & 
Horwitz, 1969). However, the explanation of ingroup favor-
itism in such minimal group paradigms (MGP; Tajfel, Billig, 
Bundy, & Flament, 1971) in terms of a self-stereotyping pro-
cess serving a self-enhancement need (Hogg & Abrams, 
1990) has been widely criticized (e.g., Cadinu & Rothbart, 
1996; Robbins & Krueger, 2005; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). 
One of the main problems with the self-stereotyping approach 
to ingroup favoritism is the “minimal” nature of these groups. 
Given the lack of group prototypes in an MGP, one may 
wonder on what grounds people evaluate their ingroup posi-
tively and use this information to infer their self-image. 
Importantly, this critique on the self-stereotyping account for 
ingroup favoritism formed the starting point for Cadinu and 
Rothbart (1996) to investigate self-anchoring as an alterna-
tive: “Overall, ingroup favoritism in the minimal group para-
digm is a well-established phenomenon, but the exact reasons 
for this favoritism remain unclear” (p. 661).
Self-Anchoring
Self-anchoring, or the projection of personal characteristics 
on the ingroup, indicates that one does not necessarily have 
to rely on group prototypes (i.e., self-stereotyping) to create 
a mental link between self and ingroup. Instead, this link can 
be based on using the personal self as a positive standard to 
define an ingroup and distinguish it from relevant outgroups. 
Specifically, Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) provided three the-
oretical premises for their reasoning: First, people generally 
possess favorable beliefs about themselves (e.g., Diener & 
Diener, 1996). Second, in minimal groups, people infer 
ingroup characteristics from the positively evaluated charac-
teristics of the self. Third, based on projection of the personal 
self onto the ingroup, the ingroup is regarded favorably and, 
by principle of differentiation (Doise & Dann, 1976), the 
outgroup will be regarded less favorably.
Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) tested their assumptions by 
providing participants with either selective information 
about a minimal ingroup, or with information about the per-
sonal self. Subsequently, participants rated the self or the 
ingroup, respectively, on the applicability of this selective 
information. Results showed that the tendency to generalize 
self-information to the ingroup was twice as large as the gen-
eralization of ingroup information to the self. Thus, in mini-
mal groups, self-anchoring was more prevalent than 
self-stereotyping. Moreover, this effect was specifically pro-
nounced for positive self-information projected onto the 
ingroup, but not the outgroup. This finding corroborated that 
a positive self-image can account for ingroup favoritism in 
minimal groups (e.g., Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005).
Further research demonstrated that the level of self-
anchoring differed more strongly between the ingroup and 
the outgroup when intergroup salience increased (Krueger & 
Clement, 1996). Furthermore, whereas Cadinu and Rothbart 
(1996) based their self-anchoring account for ingroup favor-
itism in the MGP on the three premises described above, 
work by Krueger and colleagues suggested a more parsimo-
nious explanation: Only egocentric projection of the positive 
self to the ingroup can account for ingroup favoritism, and 
the differentiation principle between ingroup and outgroup is 
not necessary for ingroup favoritism to emerge. Specifically, 
it is the asymmetry in the strength of association between the 
positive self and the ingroup on one hand and the outgroup 
on the other hand that instigates ingroup favoritism (Clement 
& Krueger, 2002; DiDonato et al., 2011; Krueger, 1998a). 
This notion was further supported with implicit measures 
(affective priming), showing that favorable ingroup evalua-
tions do not necessarily rest on explicit social comparisons 
with outgroups but rather rely on a simple association with 
the positive self (Gramzow, Gaertner, & Sedikides, 2001; 
Otten, 2002; Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 
1999). These findings reveal that an intergroup phenomenon 
(ingroup favoritism) can be explained at an intragroup level 
by merely focusing on the dynamic between the self and the 
ingroup.
Finally, self-anchoring is more than a valence effect. By 
disentangling projection of valence from projection of self-
information, research showed that self-information was a 
stronger predictor of ingroup favoritism than valence (Otten 
& Wentura, 2001) or social desirability of traits (Clement & 
Krueger, 2000, 2002). This implies that the self serves as an 
informational base to distinguish ingroups from outgroups 
(Gramzow et al., 2001).
Taken together, research in minimal groups demonstrated 
clear evidence for self-anchoring: When no information is 
available about an intergroup context, people project their 
personal self onto the ingroup, to positively distinguish the 
ingroup from the outgroup. Contrary to minimal groups, in 
real groups, providing evidence for self-anchoring is more 
challenging. In real groups, information about group stereo-
types is typically available. Thus, here people have the option 
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to assimilate the self to ingroup stereotypes (i.e., self-stereo-
typing) as well. Considering that in real groups self-stereo-
typing is a viable option, the question is whether 
self-anchoring is still a relevant process to create self–
ingroup overlap. Otten (2004) investigated this question by 
measuring the strength of the association between self and a 
real ingroup (i.e., high school students) while varying the 
order of self and ingroup ratings; this research provided only 
tentative evidence for a self-anchoring effect. More compel-
ling evidence was provided later when self-anchoring was 
demonstrated in gender groups (Otten & Epstude, 2006), stu-
dent groups (Riketta & Sacramento, 2008; Van Veelen, 2008; 
Van Veelen et al., 2011), and the (Dutch) nationality (Van 
Veelen, Otten, & Hansen, 2013b).
Two Steps Toward an Integrative 
Model
With the introduction of self-anchoring in real groups, we 
turn to the challenge of disentangling self–ingroup overlap 
stemming either from a self-stereotyping or self-anchoring 
process and integrating both in one model. As stated before, 
there are theoretical as well as methodological challenges 
that have formed obstacles to integrative models of self-
anchoring and self-stereotyping. We discuss those challenges 
and our view on how to overcome them.
Step 1: Overcoming Theoretical Challenges
There are different theoretical viewpoints on the primacy of 
the personal self or the group as inferential starting point to 
self–group overlap. From the self-stereotyping perspective it 
is argued that generic knowledge about (group) prototypes 
serves as a default2 for social inferences; any self–group 
overlap based on the personal self as a point of reference 
would either be impossible or indicate an error in social 
judgment (e.g., Deschamps & Devos, 1998; Karniol, 2003). 
In contrast, from the self-anchoring perspective, it is argued 
that the personal self is the most accessible standard in the 
cognitive system. Therefore, personal self-knowledge should 
be the default in making social inferences (e.g., Epley, 
Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Krueger, 2003; 
Mullen, 1985). We explain both viewpoints below.
Self-stereotyping as the default process. Theoretical support 
for self-stereotyping as the default process stems from the 
self-as-distinct model (Karniol, 2003). In this model, a proto-
centric view of the self in relation to others is put forward, 
stating that generic representations or prototypes (i.e., group 
stereotypes) serve as a default for inferring similarity 
between the self and others. According to this view, using 
self-knowledge to make social inferences should only occur 
in developmentally immature social beings: This would be a 
transitional stage in childhood that passes with maturation, 
when people are able to successfully transport themselves 
into the perspective of other people or groups (Selman, 
1980). Moreover, according to Karniol (2003), the use of the 
personal self to infer similarity to others is hard to reconcile 
with the notion that the self is a unique entity, used to dif-
ferentiate oneself from others (e.g., Brewer, 1993; Des-
champs & Devos, 1998): An entity that is classified as being 
distinct cannot serve as a tool to infer similarity. The minor 
role of the personal self in social perception is also empha-
sized in SCT. Specifically, as stated earlier, an important 
proposition of SCT is that people’s relation to ingroups is 
built on the perception of self as an interchangeable exem-
plar of a group’s prototype, and thus the shift away from the 
personal self. Following the principle of depersonalization, 
self–ingroup overlap cannot be based on the personal self 
and thus not on self-anchoring (e.g., Onorato & Turner, 2004; 
Simon et al., 1997; Turner et al., 1987, 1994; Verkuyten & 
Nekuee, 1999).
Empirical support for the self-stereotyping-as-default 
point of view was found in research showing that the asso-
ciative strength between self and ingroup is stronger when 
judgments about the self are based on prototypical ingroup 
information than when judgments about the ingroup are 
based on self-information (Biernat, Manis, & Kobrynowicz, 
1997; Simon & Hastedt, 1997). Furthermore, several studies 
claim to have empirically demonstrated that the correlation 
between self and ingroup ratings is higher when ingroup rat-
ings precede self-ratings than vice versa, suggesting the 
prevalence of self-stereotyping over self-anchoring (e.g., 
Guimond et al., 2006). However, in the section “Step 2: 
Overcoming Methodological Challenges,” we discuss why 
this evidence should be interpreted with caution.
Self-anchoring as the default process. Proponents of the self-
anchoring viewpoint argue that the personal self serves as the 
default to make judgments and predictions about others in 
self-relevant domains. This tendency can hardly be overrid-
den by any inference based on stereotypes (e.g., DiDonato 
et al., 2011; Krueger, 2007). The personal self is seen as the 
locus of experience and thus as basic source of inference 
about others. Specifically, with self-anchoring, there is 
always a direct link between a person’s personal perception 
and a social stimulus, whereas self-stereotyping always 
requires additional information about generic representa-
tions in the social context. Thus, the personal self is seen as 
the most immediate, parsimonious source of information; 
inferences based on self-knowledge therefore are likely to 
overrule generic knowledge (Epley et al., 2004; Krueger, 
2003).
There is a substantial body of empirical evidence support-
ing the self-anchoring-as-default point of view. Abrams 
(2011) demonstrated that among children, self-anchoring 
does not decrease with age, which contradicts Karniol’s 
(2003) assumption that egocentrism decreases with the 
development of the theory of mind. Other studies revealed 
that, as compared with ingroup ratings, self-ratings are made 
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faster (Cadinu & De Amicis, 1999; Clement & Krueger, 
2000), more easily, more accurately, and more consistently 
over time (Krueger & Stanke, 2001). Finally, inferences 
from self to ingroup are stronger compared with inferences 
from ingroup to self (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Clement & 
Krueger, 2002; Krueger & Stanke, 2001; Otten & Epstude, 
2006; for an overview, see Krueger, 2007). These findings 
directly contrast results demonstrating self-stereotyping as 
the default process.
Reconciling self-stereotyping and self-anchoring. All in all, theo-
retical and empirical support for self-stereotyping or self-
anchoring as a default process is mixed. So far neither side 
has been successful in completely ruling out the relevance of 
the respective other process, nor has a clear-cut explanation 
been offered for why sometimes self-stereotyping and some-
times self-anchoring is more prevalent. From our perspec-
tive, this is because there is not one most fundamental or 
default process (see also Ames, 2004a, 2004b3; Cho & 
Knowles, 2013). Rather, we propose that self-stereotyping 
and self-anchoring complement each other and exist in paral-
lel to infer self–ingroup overlap.
Regarding the self-stereotyping perspective, evidence for 
the claim that the social self only serves to assimilate to oth-
ers whereas the personal self only serves to differentiate 
from others (e.g., Karniol, 2003; Turner et al., 1987) is weak. 
A large body of research on the false-consensus effect has 
unambiguously shown that evaluations of others tend to be 
assimilated to the personal self (e.g., Krueger, 1998a; Ross 
et al., 1977). In fact, both the social and the personal self can 
serve as inferential starting point, under circumstances in 
which the self is somehow seen as compatible with the social 
target (Ames, 2004b; Mussweiler, 2003; Mussweiler, 
Epstude, & Rüter, 2005). From studies in both the self- 
stereotyping (e.g., Voci, 2006) and the self-anchoring domain 
(e.g., Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Krueger, 1998a; Otten & 
Wentura, 2001), there is no doubt that ingroups (contrary to 
outgroups) are perceived as compatible with the self. Also in 
our own studies, negative associations between the personal 
self and the ingroup are rarely found (e.g., Cadinu & 
Rothbart, 1996; Otten & Wentura, 2001; Van Veelen et al., 
2011, 2013b). Thus, self–ingroup overlap inferred from the 
personal self is related to assimilative tendencies.
Regarding the self-anchoring perspective, indeed, con-
vincing empirical evidence exists for the parsimony or higher 
cognitive accessibility of the personal self, as indicated by 
quicker response times on inferences based on the personal 
relative to the social self (e.g., Krueger & Stanke, 2001). Yet, 
higher cognitive accessibility of the personal self at the 
implicit level, in itself, does not provide sufficient evidence 
for the primacy of self-anchoring over self-stereotyping. It 
merely suggests that the level of information processing is 
different. Indeed, when measured explicitly, self-anchoring 
levels can be similar to (Van Veelen et al., 2011), lower than 
(Cadinu & Carnaghi, 2015), and higher than (Van Veelen 
et al., 2013b) self-stereotyping. Moreover, most empirical 
evidence showing higher prevalence of self-anchoring than 
self-stereotyping was found in minimal, group contexts. 
Such contexts are bound to reality constraints, because in 
“real” social situations, people have information not only 
about themselves at their disposal but also about their social 
context, to make social inferences (see also “Measurement 
Criteria” section).
Connectionist models to understand the mental represen-
tation of self and group (Balcetis & Dunning, 2005; E. R. 
Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999; E. R. Smith & Henry, 1996) 
provide an adequate basis for our proposition that the social 
self and the personal self act as two complementing sources 
to infer self–ingroup overlap. Specifically, connectionist 
models assume that social inferences are based on two types 
of self-relevant knowledge: (a) individuating self-knowledge 
and (b) generic knowledge about the social category or 
ingroup (Balcetis & Dunning, 2005). Accordingly, we argue 
that when people search for ways to give meaning to who 
they are (i.e., their personal self-concepts; their ingroup 
memberships), both self-anchoring and self-stereotyping can 
serve to fill cognitive gaps in the representation of either the 
person or the group. To this end, self-anchoring and self-ste-
reotyping serve as informational processes of “meaning 
making” that mutually reinforce each other to dissolve cog-
nitive ambiguities in the relation between the person and the 
ingroup.
Step 2: Overcoming Methodological Challenges
A theoretical integration of self-stereotyping and self-
anchoring provides the starting point for their simultaneous 
measurement and comparison in one research paradigm. To 
be able to interpret self–group overlap unequivocally as a 
unidirectional inference process, and to assure its discrimi-
nant validity, one should ideally measure self-anchoring and 
self-stereotyping simultaneously and intraindividually. 
Moreover, it is important for self-stereotyping and self-
anchoring measures to show construct validity (Krueger, 
Acevedo, & Robbins, 2006). Instead, scholars have used a 
large variety of measures to tap into the same inference pro-
cess. This obscures construct validity and diffuses interpreta-
tion of results in support for either self-stereotyping (e.g., 
Biernat et al., 1997; Guimond et al., 2006) or self-anchoring 
(Clement & Krueger, 2002; Otten & Epstude, 2006). To 
develop a more comparable measure of both processes, we 
provide four measurement criteria. Based on these criteria, 
we discuss how to disentangle self-anchoring and self-ste-
reotyping in one research paradigm, so that both constructs 
can be compared for their impact on social identification.
Measurement criteria. When specifying measurement crite-
ria, a clear conceptual definition is important. We define self-
stereotyping as an inference process in which self–ingroup 
overlap emerges unidirectionally, by applying prototypical 
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ingroup characteristics to the self (e.g., Latrofa et al., 2010; 
Otten & Epstude, 2006; Turner et al., 1987). Furthermore, 
we define self-anchoring as an inference process in which 
self–ingroup overlap emerges unidirectionally, by applying 
personal characteristics to the ingroup (e.g., Cadinu & Roth-
bart, 1996; Otten & Epstude, 2006; Van Veelen et al., 2011). 
Based on these elements, we discuss four criteria: overlap, 
directionality, content, and valence. Table 1 provides a tax-
onomy of self-anchoring and self-stereotyping measures 
evaluated on these criteria.4
Overlap. Self-stereotyping and self-anchoring are con-
cerned with the emergence of overlap between self and ingroup. 
Following from connectionist models (Balcetis & Dunning, 
2005; E. R. Smith et al., 1999; E. R. Smith & Henry, 1996), 
operationalizations should thus include a measure about the 
perception of the ingroup and another measure about the per-
ception of the personal self. The degree of agreement between 
the two serves as a proxy for self–ingroup overlap. Generally, 
calculations of self–group overlap are based on mean squared 
distance scores d2
2
=
−





∑ ( )self group
N traits
 or intraindividual 
profile correlations (rself.group). Overlap is an important crite-
rion, because it ensures that self-descriptions are in line with 
conceptions of the ingroup’s prototype, or vice versa (Latrofa 
et al., 2010; Otten & Epstude, 2006).
Directionality. After self–ingroup overlap is established, 
we need to know where this overlap comes from. In real 
groups, the informational base of self–ingroup overlap can 
either stem from the personal self or from the ingroup proto-
type. Hence, to be able to infer directionality in self–ingroup 
overlap, we should ensure that either the personal self affects 
subsequent ingroup ratings (i.e., self-anchoring) or the 
ingroup prototype affects subsequent self-ratings (i.e., self-
stereotyping). Directionality can be implemented between 
participants, following the induction–deduction paradigm 
(Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996). Here, for one half of the partici-
pants, fictitious information about the personal self is pro-
vided first, and subsequently, the ingroup is rated based on 
this self-information. For the other half, the opposite proce-
dure is implemented with an ingroup-feedback-then-self-
ratings sequence. Directionality can also be established 
within participants with a repeated-measures design, Here, 
on a first measurement occasion participants rate the per-
sonal self, on a second measurement occasion they rate the 
ingroup, and on a final measurement occasion the self again 
(Latrofa et al., 2010; Otten & Epstude, 2006; Van Veelen et 
al., 2011, 2013b).
Directionality is a necessary criterion, yet not sufficient to 
completely disentangle self-anchoring from self-stereotyp-
ing. This especially holds for self-stereotyping, because a 
mere order manipulation (first-group-then-self-ratings) can-
not completely rule out the influence of the personal self 
when making ingroup trait ratings (see also Cadinu & De 
Amicis, 1999; Otten, 2004). This is because the personal self 
is always cognitively accessible (i.e., we take it with us in 
every social situation), whereas the social self is not (Robbins 
& Krueger, 2005). However, when measuring self-anchoring 
in real groups, directionality does serve to control for group 
identity salience. Here, the personal self should always be 
rated prior to making the social category salient. If not, per-
sonal self-ratings may be contaminated by the activated 
social identity (e.g., Latrofa et al., 2010; Riketta & 
Sacramento, 2008). To conclude, to resolve limitations with 
directionality, an additional criterion to take into account is 
content.
Content. Content refers to what kind of information peo-
ple use to make inferences about the self or the ingroup. Ide-
ally, the content of the traits that form the basis to infer 
self–ingroup overlap should be the same across self-anchoring 
and self-stereotyping measures to optimally compare the 
relative impact of each process. In an MGP, there is a possi-
bility to achieve this between participants by giving similar 
bogus feedback (about fictitious attributes) to participants 
about either their personality or the minimal group. In this 
way, self-anchoring and self-stereotyping can be compared 
across conditions, whereas the content of self and ingroup 
information is kept constant (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996). 
However, an obvious shortcoming of providing false feed-
back about personality or group attributes on fictitious traits 
is that this set-up is rather artificial. Therefore, self-anchor-
ing and self-stereotyping are mostly measured rather than 
manipulated. In minimal groups, this means that only the 
personal self provides a meaningful entity to make social 
inferences (Otten & Wentura, 2001). Thus, self–group over-
lap (irrespective of direction and content) can be attributed to 
self-anchoring.5 In real groups, measuring self-anchoring 
and self-stereotyping means that they become comparable on 
an intraindividual level. Here the content of self-anchoring 
and self-stereotyping measures should coincide with avail-
able knowledge about the personal self or the ingroup stereo-
type, respectively. Consequently, the content of traits cannot 
be similar across both processes: Self-stereotyping can only 
be captured with traits consensually shared as diagnostic for 
the relevant social category (i.e., stereotype-relevant) but not 
for the personal self. Self-anchoring can only be captured 
with traits that are diagnostic for the personal self (i.e., ste-
reotype-irrelevant), but not for the group. Therefore, prior to 
a main study, conducting pilot studies to establish the stereo-
type (ir)relevance of traits regarding the social category of 
interest is crucial.
Valence. Finally, self-anchoring and self-stereotyping are 
informational ingroup- or self-defining processes that should 
be distinguished from self- or ingroup-enhancement pro-
cesses (Cadinu, Latrofa, & Carnaghi, 2013). Therefore, it is 
important to take into account valence as a potentially con-
founding factor. There are several ways to do so. First, 
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valence can be part of the research design by including an 
equal number of positive and negative traits and implement-
ing valence as a within-participants factor (e.g., Otten & 
Epstude, 2006). Second, one could pilot test traits and include 
only those that are neutral in valence. Third, one could partial 
out valence of traits within the score itself, by correcting for 
the valence or social desirability of the traits (e.g., Cadinu, 
Latrofa, & Carnaghi, 2013; De la Haye, 2000; Krueger & 
Clement, 1994). A combination of selecting neutral traits and 
correcting for variations in trait valence provides an even 
more conservative test (Van Veelen et al., 2011). Fourth, 
individuals differ in their perception of trait valence. By 
assessing interindividual differences in trait valence, and 
controlling for them in subsequent analyses (Cadinu, Latrofa, 
& Carnaghi, 2013; DiDonato et al., 2011; Riketta & Sacra-
mento, 2008), valence effects are even more rigorously con-
trolled for.
Disentangling Self-Anchoring and Self-
Stereotyping
From Table 1, it is evident that high variation exists in self-
stereotyping and self-anchoring measures, and that large dif-
ferences exist in their adherence to the measurement criteria. 
This is particularly the case for self-stereotyping. For exam-
ple, general similarity and self-descriptive measures of self-
stereotyping merely focus on the perception of self as being 
similar to the ingroup, and do not include the overlap crite-
rion. Therefore, these measures may not only capture self-
stereotyping but are likely to also include self-anchoring. 
Overlap measures are used both to operationalize self- 
stereotyping and self-anchoring, alone or simultaneously. 
Yet, content, directionality, and valence criteria are dealt 
with very differently across studies. Therefore, studies that 
claim empirical support for either self-stereotyping or self-
anchoring as a default process (e.g., Guimond et al., 2006; 
Krueger & Stanke, 2001) should first be carefully evaluated 
on measurement criteria, before interpretation of these find-
ings can be considered reliable. Below we discuss two meth-
ods to disentangle self-anchoring from self-stereotyping 
while taking into account the measurement criteria.
An implicit method. The first scholars to measure self-anchor-
ing and self-stereotyping simultaneously in real groups while 
addressing measurement criteria were Otten and Epstude 
(2006). Their research design was based on an implicit reac-
tion time paradigm by Smith and colleagues (e.g., E. R. Smith 
et al., 1999; E. R. Smith & Henry, 1996). First, 90 positive 
and negative traits (valence) were rated for the self and the 
ingroup on a 7-point Likert-type scale. Then, self-anchoring 
scores were calculated with response time analysis on subse-
quent ingroup ratings (yes/no; overlap and directionality), 
only with those traits that, on the prior task, were ambigu-
ously defined for the ingroup (the scale midpoint 4) and 
clearly defined for the self (1-3 and 5-7; content). Conversely, 
self-stereotyping scores were calculated with response time 
analysis on subsequent self-ratings (yes/no) with traits a pri-
ori defined as ambiguous for the self, yet clear for the group. 
Results showed significant evidence for self-anchoring but 
not for self-stereotyping. Using a similar paradigm, subse-
quent studies further replicated and refined this method (Cho 
& Knowles, 2013; Van Veelen, 2008).6
An explicit method. Recently, self-anchoring and self-stereo-
typing were also disentangled based on explicit overlap mea-
sures (Van Veelen et al., 2011, 2013b). Prior to the main 
study, a large number of traits were pilot tested on stereotype 
relevance or irrelevance in relation to the ingroup of interest 
(i.e., students; the Dutch). An equal amount of stereotype-
relevant and irrelevant traits was selected for the main study 
(content), all being approximately neutral in valence (Valence 
1). In the main study, to measure self-anchoring, the personal 
self was rated on stereotype-irrelevant traits, prior to making 
the ingroup salient. Subsequently, the ingroup was rated on 
the stereotype-irrelevant traits (overlap and directionality). A 
profile correlation was calculated while controlling for item 
popularity (Valence 2). To measure self-stereotyping, the 
ingroup was also rated on the stereotype-relevant traits. Sub-
sequently, the self was rated again, this time on the stereo-
type-relevant traits, and profile correlation was calculated. 
Results showed that the associative strength of self–ingroup 
overlap was equally strong for both processes.
The IMSI
By overcoming the challenges discussed above, theoretically 
self-anchoring and self-stereotyping can exist in parallel to 
form two cognitive means to create self–group overlap. 
Methodologically, with help of measurement criteria, both 
concepts can be distinguished from each other intraindividu-
ally. This sets the stage for the IMSI (Figure 1).
Premises of the Model
The model is based on the premise that both self-anchoring 
and self-stereotyping are informational processes of “mean-
ing making” that can mutually reinforce each other to dis-
solve cognitive ambiguities in the relation between the 
person and the ingroup (see also discussion in “Reconciling 
Self-Anchoring and Self-Stereotyping” section). This rea-
soning fits with induction–deduction principles (e.g., Cadinu 
& Carnaghi, 2015; Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Krueger, 
2007). Specifically, self-anchoring follows the principles of 
inductive reasoning by Krueger and colleagues (e.g., 
DiDonato et al., 2011; Krueger, 2007). Here, the personal 
self is used as a sample of n = 1 to infer from what is known 
(i.e., the personal self) to the yet unknown (i.e., the ingroup 
representation). Self-anchoring is thus conceptualized as a 
process in which people project personal attributes onto an 
ingroup to fill “cognitive gaps” in the representation of the 
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Table 1. Overview of Operationalization of Self-Stereotyping and Self-Anchoring, Evaluated Based on the Four Measurement Criteria, 
Namely, Overlap, Directionality, Content, and Valence.
Type of measure Authors
Self-stereotyping Self-anchoring
Overlap Direction Content Valence Overlap Direction Content Valence
Explicit
 General similarity Leach et al. (2008) 0 0 0 0  
Simon, Pantaleo, and Mummendey (1995) 0 0 0 0  
Simon, Hastedt, and Aufderheide (1997) 0 0 0 0  
Verkuyten and Nekuee (1999) 0 0 0 0  
Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers (1997) 0 0 0 0  
 Self-descriptive Hogg and Turner (1987) 0 0 X X  
Hundhammer and Mussweiler (2012) 0 0 X 0  
Laurin, Kay, and Shepherd (2011) 0 0 X 0  
Lun, Sinclair, and Cogburn (2009)a 0 0 X X  
Onorato and Turner (2004)b 0 0 X 0  
Pickett, Bonner, and Coleman (2002) 0 0 X X  
Simon and Hamilton (1994) 0 0 X X  
Simon, Glässner-Bayerl, and Stratenwerth (1991) 0 0 X X  
 Overlap scores
  Pictorial Tropp and Wright (2001, 2003)c X 0 0 0  
  D2 Cadinu and Rothbart (1996d)
Cadinu and Carnaghi (2015)
X
X
X
X
Xe
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
NA
X
X
X
  Profile r Ryan and Bogart (2001) X X X X  
Ames (2004a); Study 1f X X X 0
Biernat, Vescio, and Green (1996) X X X X  
Bianchi, Machunsky, Steffens, and Mummendey 
(2009)
X X X X
Cadinu, Latrofa, and Carnaghi (2013)g X X X X  
Cho and Knowles (2013); Studies 1 and 2 X X Xh X X X Xi X
Clement and Krueger (2000); Study 2d X X NA 0
Clement and Krueger (2002)d X ? NA X
Eidelman and Silvia (2010) X X X X  
DiDonato, Ullrich, and Krueger (2011)d X X NA X
Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, Crisp, and 
Redersdorff (2006)
X X X 0 X X 0j 0
Krueger and Clement (1996); Exp. 1d X X NA X
Krueger and Clement (1996); Exp. 2 X X 0 X
Krueger and Zeiger (1993); Exp. 1 X 0k X 0
Krueger and Stanke (2001) X X 0 X
Latrofa, Vaes, and Cadinu (2012) X 0l Xm X  
Latrofa, Vaes, Pastore, and Cadinu (2009) X X X X X X X X
Latrofa, Vaes, Cadinu, and Carnaghi (2010) X 0l Xm X  
Otten and Wentura (2001)d X X NA X
Otten and Bar-Tal (2002)d X X NA 0
Riketta and Sacramento (2008); Exp. 1d X X NA X
Riketta and Sacramento (2008); Exp. 2 X X X X
Sherman and Kim (2005) X ? 0 0
van Hoomissen and van Overwalle (2010)d,n X X 0 X X X NA X
Van Veelen, Otten, and Hansen (2010) X X X X
Van Veelen, Otten, and Hansen (2011) X X X X X X X X
Van Veelen, Otten, and Hansen (2013b); Study 1d X X X X
Van Veelen et al. (2013b); Study 2 X X X X X X X X
van Veelen, Hansen, and Otten (2014) X X X X X X X X
Implicit
 Self-descriptive Cadinu and Galdi (2012) 0 0 X 0  
Cadinu, Galdi, and Maass (2013) 0 0 X 0  
Lorenzi-Cioldi (1991) 0 0 X X  
Lun et al. (2009) 0 0 X X  
Onorato and Turner (2004) 0 0 X X  
Otten and Wentura (1999)d 0 0 NA X
(continued)
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Type of measure Authors
Self-stereotyping Self-anchoring
Overlap Direction Content Valence Overlap Direction Content Valence
 Overlap Cadinu and De Amicis (1999) X X 0 X X X 0 X
Coats, Smith, Claypool, and Banner (2000) X X 0 0  
Cho and Knowles (2013); Study 4 X X 0 X X X 0 X
Machunsky and Meiser (2009) X X X 0
Otten and Epstude (2006) X X X X X X X X
E. R. Smith, Coats, and Walling (1999) X X 0 X  
E. R. Smith and Henry (1996) X X 0 X  
Tropp and Wright (2001) X X 0 0  
Van Veelen (2008) X X X X X X X X
Note. (1) The “X” label means that the criterion was taken into account. (2) The “0” label means that the criterion was not taken into account. (3) The “?” label means that 
information about this criterion was not specified in the article. (4) For the Content criterion specifically, “NA” (Not Applicable) means that the content criterion is not a 
precondition for an appropriate measure (i.e., when measuring self-anchoring in a minimal group). (5) For Valence, an “X” means that valence of items was either taken into 
account, and/or controlled for in the calculation of the score (for example, based on item popularity).
aLun et al. (2009) is inserted twice in this table as they adopted more than one methodology to measure self-stereotyping.
bOnorato and Turner (2004) was inserted twice in this table as they adopted more than one methodology to measure self-stereotyping.
cSchubert and Otten (2002) developed a similar pictorial measure to capture self–group overlap, but did not claim any directionality for this measure and therefore they are not 
included in this table.
dStudies that were conducted in minimal groups. They have been marked because the content criterion does not apply to self-anchoring measures in this type of group context.
eBased on bogus feedback manipulation of group stereotypes in minimal group.
fIngroup was made salient before self-ratings. Stereotypes were part of the study, but always referred to an outgroup. Studies 2 to 4 only measured self-anchroring to outgroup 
(not ingroup) and were therefore beyond the scope of this article.
gAlthough eight stereotype-irrelevant traits were inserted in the methodological approach in this study, they were not included as part of a self-anchoring measure.
hBased on bogus feedback manipulation on group stereotypes in real groups.
iBased on bogus feedback manipulation on personality traits.
jContent of traits merely related to stereotypical group attributes and hence not suitable for the measurement of self-anchoring.
kDirection of self- and group ratings was (group → self), which is opposite from what self-anchoring requires.
lDirection of self- and group ratings was (self → group), which is opposite from what self-stereotyping requires.
mAlthough four stereotype-irrelevant traits were inserted in the study, they were not included as part of a self-anchoring measure.
nAn order manipulation of self–group directionality was implemented, but no hypotheses were formulated on self-stereotyping.
Table 1. (continued)
GROUP
INDIVIDUAL
SOCIAL IDENTIFICATIONSelf-anchoring Self-stereotyping
Group context:
- Group clarity
- Time
- Minority/majority
Individual differences:
- Cognive structure
- Self-esteem
- (Cultural) self-construal
Figure 1. The Integrative Model of Social Identification (IMSI): Self-stereotyping and self-anchoring as two cognitive pathways.
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ingroup. Circumstances under which this is likely to happen 
is when there is uncertainty or lack of clarity about what the 
group identity stands for (Cadinu & Carnaghi, 2015; Van 
Veelen et al., 2013b).
In addition, in daily life, people often do not only have 
information about the personal self at their disposal but also 
information about shared behaviors, thoughts, and feelings 
as ingroup members (i.e., the social self). Following the prin-
ciples of deductive reasoning, this means that stereotypical 
ingroup traits can also form an informational base (an addi-
tional sample) to make self–group inferences (Dawes, 1990). 
Thus, self-stereotyping is a process that is particularly likely 
to occur when stereotype-relevant ingroup information 
serves as a diagnostic tool to provide meaning to unknown or 
undiscovered parts of the self-concept (Van Veelen et al., 
2011, 2013b). This latter reasoning also fits Uncertainty 
Reduction Model (URM; Hogg, 2007), such that self-stereo-
typing occurs to reduce uncertainty and give meaning to the 
self in social context.
Taken together, both the personal and the social self can 
serve as knowledge base to resolve cognitive ambiguities in 
the representation of the group or the person respectively. 
Our assertion is that when people successfully align the self-
concept in relation to their ingroup—via self-anchoring or 
self-stereotyping—this forms the basis for their level of 
social identification. This assertion implies that the IMSI 
presumes that it is possible to have a causal path from self-
anchoring and self-stereotyping as cognitive predictors to 
social identification as an outcome variable. This path is sup-
ported by cognitive appraisal theories also proposing a “first-
cognition-then-affect” sequence to explain emotional 
responses (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). Moreover, it 
also fits the social judgability approach (Yzerbyt, Schadron, 
Leyens, & Rocher, 1994) stating that people need to have 
diagnostic information before they feel they can make social 
judgments.
In self-anchoring literature, this causal path is indirectly 
supported by research on ingroup favoritism in MGPs. Here, 
the personal self forms the only source of inference to pro-
vide meaning to a relatively unknown ingroup and to subse-
quently explain ingroup favoritism (e.g., Cadinu & Rothbart, 
1996; Otten & Wentura, 2001). Based on this work, we 
assume that to the extent that the personal self provides 
meaning to unknown parts of an ingroup, it also enables 
members to identify, that is, attach affective significance to 
the group.
Similarly, for self-stereotyping, we assume that when an 
ingroup prototype provides meaning to unknown or undis-
covered parts of the personal self-concept, this results in an 
affective bond with the ingroup. For example, people may 
decide to join groups because they expect these groups to 
bring certain valuable new elements to their self-concept. 
Through interaction and experience as ingroup members, 
ingroup prototypes become meaningful to the self (e.g., L. G. 
E. Smith & Postmes, 2011), and self-stereotyping becomes 
diagnostic of social identification. Supporting this assump-
tion, empirical evidence from a recent longitudinal study 
showed that self-stereotyping among newcomers (Time 1) 
predicted identification after a socialization period, once 
group membership was well established (Time 2). No evi-
dence was found for the reversed causal path (a longitudinal 
effect of newcomers’ social identification on self-stereotyp-
ing). These findings corroborate self-stereotyping as a pos-
sible predictor of social identification (Van Veelen, Hansen, 
& Otten, 2014).
Empirical Evidence
Particularly for the self-stereotyping and social identification 
link, the empirical evidence is remarkably scarce; many 
influential theories and models to understand group pro-
cesses rely on this link to explain why people think, feel, and 
act on behalf of their ingroup. For example, URM (Hogg, 
2007) assumes that people identify with groups via the 
assimilation to an ingroup prototype to reduce uncertainty 
about the self. Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (ODT; 
Brewer, 1991) assumes that people’s need to belong insti-
gates the assimilation of the self to an ingroup’s prototype, 
which results in social identification (Leonardelli, Pickett, & 
Brewer, 2010). Finally, the Social Identity Model of 
Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2012) relies 
on SCT (Turner et al., 1987) to explain how people’s percep-
tion of self in ingroup terms enhances the willingness to act 
on behalf of their ingroup. Yet, the assumption that self-ste-
reotyping forms the cognitive basis for social identification 
in these models was not empirically tested.
The first empirical studies on the self-stereotyping and 
social identification link focused on the relation between 
general indicators of similarity or prototypicality in the 
ingroup (as proxy for self-stereotyping) and social identifica-
tion (Spears et al., 1997; Verkuyten & Nekuee, 1999). 
However, based on the measurement criteria above, we 
should interpret this evidence with caution, because general 
similarity measures do not disentangle self-stereotyping 
from self-anchoring processes. The first empirical evidence 
corroborating the link between self-stereotyping and identifi-
cation, while taking into account methodological criteria, 
was provided by Latrofa and colleagues (see Table 1). They 
measured self-stereotyping among low-status groups (i.e., 
Southern Italians: Latrofa et al., 2009; women: Cadinu et al., 
2012; Latrofa et al., 2010) and found a significant relation 
with identification.7
The first empirical evidence for the self-anchoring and 
social identification link was provided in two studies using 
real groups (Dutch national identity: Van Veelen, Otten, & 
Hansen, 2010; Psychology students: Van Veelen et al., 2011, 
Study 1) and showed that projection of personal attributes to 
the ingroup positively related to social identification. This 
was the first evidence demonstrating a central role for the 
personal self in shaping a group bond. However, these 
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studies did not focus on the joint impact of self-anchoring 
and self-stereotyping on identification. When individuals are 
given the opportunity to self-stereotype in real groups, does 
self-anchoring still uniquely contribute to social identifica-
tion? In recent follow-up studies, self-anchoring and self-
stereotyping were measured simultaneously, and results 
showed that both predicted a unique proportion of variance 
in social identification. These findings delineate that in real 
groups, where knowledge on group stereotypes is available, 
the personal self also plays a central role for social identifica-
tion (Van Veelen et al., 2011, 2013b; Van Veelen et al., 2014).
Together, these findings provide support for the IMSI, in 
which both self-anchoring and self-stereotyping form cogni-
tive paths to social identification. In contrast to earlier 
assumptions of SIT and SCT (e.g., Mullen, Migdal, & Rozell, 
2003; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), the IMSI 
implies that the social and the personal self are not necessar-
ily functionally antagonistic, existing at opposite ends of one 
continuum. Rather, they may exist on two separate continua 
and work together as two distinct sources of inference to cre-
ate mental overlap and to identify with ingroups.
Moderators
We now apply the IMSI to different group contexts and 
individuals to outline the conditions under which either 
self-anchoring, self-stereotyping, or both may form the 
cognitive mechanisms to explain social identification lev-
els. We argue that the relative impact of self-anchoring and 
self-stereotyping on identification varies depending on the 
extent to which group knowledge and/or self-knowledge 
allow for a meaning-making process. Specifically, self-ste-
reotyping should be a cognitive explanation for social iden-
tification, when information about the group’s prototype is 
perceived as available and applicable to the self. In con-
trast, self-anchoring should be a cognitive explanation for 
social identification, when information about the personal 
self is available and applicable to an ingroup. When both 
self- and ingroup knowledge are available and applicable, 
both self-anchoring and self-stereotyping may simultane-
ously explain social identification. Conversely, when self- 
and ingroup knowledge are both absent, this may obstruct 
cognitive alignment of the self with the ingroup and result 
in low identification. Thus, application of the IMSI in vari-
ous groups and among different individuals offers a frame-
work to explain for whom (type of individual) and when 
(type of ingroup) the two processes function as cognitive 
catalysts for identification.
Group context moderators. In this section, we discuss empir-
ical evidence on three group context variables expected to 
moderate the impact of self-anchoring and self-stereotyp-
ing on social identification in the IMSI, namely, clarity 
of a group’s identity content, time, and majority/minority 
position.
Clarity of a group’s identity content. A group is unclearly 
defined when there is no clear-cut knowledge available about 
the content of a group identity, whereas a clearly defined 
group context provides unequivocal knowledge about its 
identity content (see also Machunsky, Meiser, & Mum-
mendey, 2009; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 
2003).
In both the self-stereotyping and self-anchoring literature, 
there are indications that self-stereotyping plays a more 
important role in clearly defined groups, whereas self-
anchoring does so in unclearly defined groups. Within the 
self-stereotyping domain, research has shown that a social 
category should be highly salient (Verkuyten & Nekuee, 
1999), meaningful (Simon et al., 1997), and important 
(Pickett et al., 2002) for people to assimilate the self to the 
group prototype. Along this line, there is evidence revealing 
that for minority, or low-status, group members (for whom 
their group membership is generally highly salient [McGuire 
& McGuire, 1988] and meaningful [Simon & Hamilton, 
1994]), prevalence of self-stereotyping is higher than for 
majority members (e.g., Cadinu et al., 2012; Latrofa et al., 
2010; Spears et al., 1997).
Within the self-anchoring domain, a meta-analysis 
across 19 studies (Robbins & Krueger, 2005) indicated that 
the projection of personal attributes onto the ingroup (i.e., 
self-anchoring) is significantly higher in minimal groups 
(in which a group’s identity is absent or meaningless) as 
compared with real groups. Furthermore, research directly 
manipulating the clarity of a group’s identity content in 
both a minimal and a real group revealed that with decreas-
ing levels of group clarity, the level of self-anchoring 
increased (Van Veelen et al., 2013b). Finally, Cadinu and 
Carnaghi (2015) compared self-anchoring and self-stereo-
typing levels in groups pilot-tested as being meaningful 
(i.e., women sorority, and left-handedness) and showed that 
in these meaningful groups, self-stereotyping prevailed 
over self-anchoring. This finding directly contrasts with 
results from Cadinu and Rothbart’s (1996) initial studies in 
minimal groups, in which self-anchoring prevailed over 
self-stereotyping.
All in all, these findings provide direct or indirect evi-
dence that the ratio in explained variance of self-stereotyping 
relative to self-anchoring gradually increases as the content 
of an ingroup identity shifts from clear and well-defined, to 
ambiguous and ill-defined. An additional step is required to 
find out whether group clarity also affects how people iden-
tify. If self-information is more diagnostic to make infer-
ences in unclearly defined groups, whereas group information 
is more diagnostic to make inferences in clearly defined 
groups, this implies that in clear groups, identification is 
most likely predicted via self-stereotyping, whereas in 
unclear groups, via self-anchoring. Direct evidence for this 
was provided in a study in which group clarity was manipu-
lated and people’s levels of self-anchoring, self-stereotyping, 
and social identification were measured. Results showed that 
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in the unclear group, self-anchoring most strongly related to 
identification, whereas self-stereotyping did so in the clear 
group (Van Veelen et al., 2013b). Thus, the impact of self-
anchoring versus self-stereotyping on identification was 
moderated by group clarity.
Time. A second group context moderator in our model 
showing relevant links with the clarity of a group’s identity 
content is time. The IMSI assumes there are longitudinal 
changes in the role of self-anchoring and self-stereotyp-
ing for social identification. Remember Mark, the new-
comer in an organization. As a new employee, one of his 
primary concerns is probably to get to know the organiza-
tion and affiliate with his new colleagues (Tuckman, 1965). 
For new group members such as Mark, what it means to 
be a member of a new group is often quite unclear. There 
is still a lot to learn about the group, including its stereo-
typical characteristics and practices (Levine, Moreland, & 
Ryan, 1998). Consequently, new group members are often 
quite uncertain about what their new group identity stands 
for. Therefore, at an early stage of group membership, the 
scarcity of information about the group may lead newcom-
ers to rely heavily on self-knowledge as a cognitive basis to 
create self–group overlap and identify highly with groups. 
We derive this reasoning from our prior discussion demon-
strating that self-anchoring is more prevalent in ill-defined, 
minimal groups, compared with well-defined, real groups 
(Robbins & Krueger, 2005; Van Veelen et al., 2013b). At 
later stages, group members become more familiar with the 
group’s norms and values. Indeed, a longitudinal increase in 
familiarity with the group leads to greater accuracy of group 
stereotype estimations (Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991; Ryan & 
Bogart, 2001). Thus, for full-fledged group members, proto-
typical characteristics of the group are likely more clear and 
can therefore be integrated in the self. For newcomer Mark, 
this implies that over time he can use not only self-knowl-
edge (i.e., self-anchoring) but also group knowledge (i.e., 
self-stereotyping) to infer a self–ingroup bond and identify 
with his organization.
First empirical support for longitudinal changes in the 
impact of self-anchoring and self-stereotyping on identifica-
tion was provided by a study investigating changes in group 
identity development among first-year psychology students 
(Van Veelen et al., 2014). Students filled out a questionnaire 
on identification with psychology students in the first month 
of their studies, and again after 6 to 7 months, when group 
membership was expected to be well established (Amiot 
et al., 2007). Results showed that among newcomers, self-
anchoring predicted identification, whereas self-stereotyping 
did not. In contrast, after 6 months of socialization, self- 
stereotyping but not self-anchoring predicted social identifi-
cation. These findings provide first support that newcomers 
in groups rely more heavily on their personal than the social 
self to identify with groups, and vice versa when group mem-
bership is well established.
Minority/majority position. Third, the role of self-anchoring 
and self-stereotyping for social identification may be differ-
ent for members in a minority relative to a majority subgroup 
position.8 Research has shown that when faced with iden-
tity threat, low-status minority members’ self-stereotyping 
positively relates to identification and subjective well-being, 
whereas no such effect was found for majority members 
(Latrofa et al., 2009, 2012). Thus, for minority, more than for 
majority members, self-stereotyping forms a good strategy to 
identify, to protect themselves against identity threat, and to 
re-affirm a positive subgroup identity and well-being (Brans-
combe et al., 1999). However, although self-stereotyping 
serves a protective function for minorities in their own sub-
group, paradoxically, it also legitimizes minority members’ 
low-status position in the superordinate social hierarchy. 
To illustrate this, research revealed that the more both men 
and women attributed gender stereotypes to themselves, the 
more they legitimized status differences between men and 
women (Laurin et al., 2011). Thus, within the subgroup, 
self-stereotyping protects minority members’ well-being and 
identification, but in the superordinate social hierarchy, self-
stereotyping justifies minority members’ unfair treatment 
and lack of inclusion relative to majority members.
The IMSI may shed more light on this negative effect of 
self-stereotyping for minority members’ identification with 
superordinate groups and puts forward self-anchoring as a 
potentially better alternative. Self-stereotyping relies on 
assimilation to a group prototype. Yet, the superordinate 
group’s prototype typically only fits with majority but not 
with minority members (see also ingroup projection; 
Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Thus, self-stereotyping 
likely works best as a cognitive route to identification for 
majority members and hinders minority members’ identifica-
tion, as they are comparatively deviant from the superordi-
nate group’s prototype. In contrast, with self-anchoring, 
prototypicality is no longer a relevant criterion to make 
social inferences, but the personal self is. Everyone has a 
personal self at his or her disposal, to infer a cognitive bond 
with a superordinate group. Indeed, people’s personal self 
forms a relevant sample of n = 1 to project to a superordinate 
category (Krueger & DiDonato, 2008; Riketta & Sacramento, 
2008). Thus, self-anchoring may facilitate majority and 
minority members’ identification with a superordinate group.
First empirical support for the reasoning above was 
found in a study by Van Veelen, Otten, and Hansen (2013a). 
Here, participants were categorized in either a minority or 
majority subgroup position in the lab, and instructed to 
engage in either self-anchoring or self-stereotyping. Results 
showed that minority members’ identification with the 
superordinate group was significantly higher when they 
engaged in self-anchoring compared with self-stereotyping. 
For majority members, equal levels of identification were 
observed for both projection processes. Hence, the relative 
impact of self-stereotyping and self-anchoring on identifica-
tion with superordinate groups was moderated by minority/
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majority position. This moderating effect rests on differ-
ences in perceived applicability of group knowledge to the 
self (and not availability as with the previous two modera-
tors). Indeed, minority, more than majority members, indi-
cated that self-stereotyping was difficult, suggesting that the 
group prototype did not fit their self-concept (Van Veelen 
et al., 2013a). These findings are highly relevant in today’s 
diverse society in which majority and minority subgroup 
members are required to co-exist within the same inclusive 
groups. Here, taking the personal (rather than the social) self 
as a starting point to make social inferences may allow all 
group members to belong while being different.
To conclude, group context moderators are important to 
understand the relation between self-anchoring, self-stereo-
typing, and social identification. The empirical evidence 
summarized above illustrates that our cognitive understand-
ing of how people identify with groups largely benefits from 
a dynamic approach; different cognitive routes provide an 
answer to how people identify in different groups varying in 
the availability and applicability of group knowledge. 
Therefore, we encourage research on the IMSI to further 
understand and optimize identification processes in com-
plex, diverse, or new groups.
Individual differences. Not only differences at the group level 
but also differences at the individual level may affect the role 
of self-anchoring and self-stereotyping for social identifica-
tion. Do some people rely more heavily on their personal 
selves to make social inferences, whereas others rather infer 
who they are from generic representations of the social con-
text? There is little research on how individual differences 
affect self-anchoring, and even less so on self-stereotyping. 
Next, we introduce three individual difference variables in 
the IMSI, which we assume to affect cognitive social infer-
ence processes, namely, the ability and need for cognitive 
structure, self-esteem, and (cultural) self-construal.
The ability and need for cognitive structure. In 1998, Sta-
novich was the first to examine the relationship between 
individual differences in cognitive ability and social infer-
ence processes, such as self-anchoring. However, he found 
no significant relation between the two. In reviewing this lit-
erature, Krueger (1998b) concluded that most people project 
from the self to groups, and some do it more than others, but 
that factors explaining these individual differences are still 
absent. In 2002, first empirical insights into individual differ-
ences in self-anchoring were reported by Otten and Bar-Tal; 
they found that people high in ability and need for cognitive 
structure self-anchor more.
From this evidence it seems that people who are able to 
process information thoroughly and in structured fashion to 
create certainty in their lives show a higher tendency to use 
the personal self as a source of social inference. In this case, 
people perceive self-knowledge as both applicable and 
available to make inferences about ingroups. Whether need 
and/or ability for cognitive structure are related to self-
anchoring and self-stereotyping as cognitive paths to social 
identification is still unclear. To provide further insights into 
this matter, it is necessary to measure both self-anchoring 
and self-stereotyping simultaneously (a condition not met in 
the research by Otten & Bar-Tal, 2002). Such research could 
investigate how people with a low ability for cognitive struc-
ture create certainty and order in their lives. One could spec-
ulate that in this situation, rather than focusing on the 
personal self, people may reach out to the group prototype to 
make social inferences and create cognitive structure. This 
would be in line with URM’s (Hogg, 2007) proposition that 
identification via self-stereotyping reduces uncertainty and 
provides structure.
Self-esteem. Self-esteem is another individual difference 
variable that may affect people’s perceived applicability 
and availability of self-knowledge to make social inferences 
between the self and the ingroup. First evidence for this prem-
ise was provided by Gramzow and Gaertner’s (2005) Self 
as Evaluative Base (SEB) model. In four experiments with 
minimal groups, these authors demonstrated that personal 
self-esteem enhanced positive ingroup evaluations (relative 
to outgroup evaluations), independent of the valence of the 
group context (ingroup and outgroup were objectively the 
same), independent of cognitive information processing, and 
independent of other individual difference variables (i.e., 
right-wing authoritarianism, narcissism). Later research fur-
ther showed that global self-esteem contributes to ingroup 
favoritism specifically through its association with the trait-
based positivity of the self-image (DiDonato et al., 2011).
Potentially, these findings imply that those with high per-
sonal self-esteem also identify more strongly with groups via 
self-anchoring. We know from recent research that particu-
larly among high identifiers of a minimal group, self-esteem 
was positively related to intergroup bias, a process that Roth 
and Steffens (2014) call associative self-anchoring. Yet, the 
role of personal self-esteem in the relation between self-
anchoring, self-stereotyping, and identification has not been 
investigated so far. Therefore, we encourage further research 
on the application of this individual difference variable in the 
IMSI.
Self-construal. Finally, people’s level of self-anchoring or 
self-stereotyping and its implications for social identification 
may also vary depending on whether people construe their 
self-concepts based on personal goals, values, and character-
istics, or based on group goals, values, and characteristics. 
Self-construal is an individual difference variable that refers 
to the content of self-knowledge and therewith to the type 
of information that is available about the self. A large body 
of research revealed that within and across cultures, people 
vary in how they construe themselves as a unique individ-
ual, independent of their social context, or as interdependent 
social being, embedded in the social context (e.g., M. Becker 
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et al., 2012; Brewer & Roccas, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Singelis, 1994).
Thus far, little research has been conducted on how varia-
tions in self-construal affect people’s social identification 
processes. Prior research has shown that with individualism, 
judgment and causal inference are oriented to the person as 
the unit of analysis, whereas with collectivism, judgment and 
causal inference are oriented to the social context as the unit 
of analysis (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). Thus, one 
may assume that because identification via self-anchoring 
places such high emphasis on the personal self, this process 
requires an individualistic, independent self-concept. To the 
contrary, because identification via self-stereotyping places 
emphasis on assimilation and conformity to the group, it 
requires a collectivistic, interdependent self-concept. A first 
indication for this idea was found by Van Veelen et al. (2011), 
who investigated the relationship between self-anchoring, 
self-stereotyping, social identification, and people’s self-
concept stability. Self-concept stability refers to the extent to 
which individual self-concepts are stable and accessible 
across different situations and in interaction with different 
people (Kernis & Goldman, 2005), and thus to an indepen-
dent self-construal (Singelis, 1994). Two studies demon-
strated that those with highly stable self-concepts identified 
via self-anchoring (Studies 1 and 2), but not via self-stereo-
typing (Study 2; Van Veelen et al., 2011). These findings sug-
gest that differences in self-construal may form an important 
explanatory factor in relation to the two cognitive pathways 
to social identification. However, the picture of this dynamic 
is still far from fully painted, and future research is required. 
For example, one could focus on manipulating self-construal 
based on “I” versus “we” primes (Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 
1999; Oyserman & Lee, 2008), or study the effects of self-
anchoring and self-stereotyping cross-culturally, to unravel 
the cognitive pathways to identification in individualistic 
versus collectivistic cultures. Thus far, the empirical evi-
dence is promising and suggests a relevant area for further 
research.
Overall, the group and individual difference moderators 
in the IMSI delineate the importance of a dynamic approach 
to understand how people identify with groups. In future 
research, we encourage investigating group and individual 
differences together in one study. The extent to which people 
rely on the personal self or the social self to identify with 
their ingroup is likely to be determined by the dynamic inter-
play between individual and group differences in the avail-
ability and applicability of self- and group knowledge.
Implications and Future Perspectives
In this review, we presented the IMSI. We demonstrated the 
conditions under which self-stereotyping, self-anchoring, or 
both positively relate to identification with ingroups. The 
IMSI is grounded in a review of theory and research on self-
anchoring and self-stereotyping. We tackled theoretical and 
methodological challenges to allow for the joint investiga-
tion of self-anchoring and self-stereotyping as two comple-
mentary processes to social identification. Theoretically, our 
model delineates how, by the principle of meaning making, 
both the social and the personal self may function as cogni-
tive mechanisms to identification. Methodologically, our 
measurement criteria lay the groundwork to substantially 
facilitate and improve research designs that aim to integrate 
self-anchoring and self-stereotyping for their impact on 
group phenomena. Finally, the model’s application to differ-
ent types of groups and individuals sets the stage for future 
research to explore the dynamic interplay between the indi-
vidual and the group.
Personal and Social Self
The IMSI adheres to the increased interest in the role of the 
personal self in social identity research (Brewer & Roccas, 
2001; Jans, Postmes, & Van der Zee, 2011; Jetten & Postmes, 
2006; Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005; Sedikides & 
Brewer, 2001). To understand how people function as 
ingroup members, we argue that it is important to consider 
both the personal (individual) self and the social (collective) 
self. This denotes an interactive view of the personal and the 
social self, in relation to social identity processes (Deaux, 
1993; Eidelman & Silvia, 2010; Reid & Deaux, 1996). Also, 
the idea that the personal and social selves complement each 
other to create self–group overlap and to facilitate social 
identification forms a new, different view on classic SCT 
assumptions, in which both exist as opposite ends of a con-
tinuum (e.g., Turner et al., 1987).
In our research, we generally find a positive correlation 
between self-anchoring and self-stereotyping: High identi-
fiers use both pathways to create self–group overlap. Yet, 
there are variations in the strength of associations between 
the two across studies. For example, in the study on new-
comers’ identification, the correlation between self-anchor-
ing and self-stereotyping was substantially lower at the 
beginning of group membership than after 6 months of 
socialization (Van Veelen et al., 2014). This finding sug-
gests an interesting link to a recently growing literature on 
identity fusion (Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse, & 
Bastian, 2012). Identify fusion implies that sometimes, per-
sonal and social selves collide completely. In other words, 
“I becomes we” and vice versa. Presumably, when the lines 
between social and personal selves are blurred, self-anchor-
ing and self-stereotyping show high multicollinearity 
despite efforts to methodologically disentangle both. 
Nevertheless, in our studies, intraindividual measures of 
self-anchoring and self-stereotyping have always explained 
unique variance in social identification, thus capturing the 
unique contribution of the personal and the social self. 
Future research should investigate when the association 
between self-anchoring and self-stereotyping is such that it 
would qualify as a fused identity.
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Advancing Social Identity–Based Theories
The IMSI further advances theories and models relying on 
self-stereotyping principles to social identification. In most 
social identity research, it is assumed, at least implicitly, that 
a group member strongly assimilating the self to ingroup 
norms (i.e., self-stereotyping) is a high identifier, whereas a 
group member deviating from ingroup norms is a low identi-
fier (e.g., Ellemers et al., 2002). However, recent research 
demonstrates that people can be loyal to their ingroup 
(Hornsey & Jetten, 2005) or identify strongly with their 
ingroup (Packer, 2008) without necessarily conforming to 
ingroup norms. Our model subscribes to this idea and offers 
a cognitive explanation for how non-conforming, but highly 
identified group members may identify: via self-anchoring. 
Self-anchoring allows to create a cognitive self–group bond 
via the personal self, without the necessity to assimilate to 
group norms. One could even speculate that those who self-
anchor are particularly mindful about the problems that cur-
rent group norms pose to the ingroup and aim to re-shape and 
negotiate ingroup norms to stimulate social change (L. G. E. 
Smith, Thomas, & McGarty, 2014).
As stated before, URM (Hogg, 2007) assumes that peo-
ple’s need to reduce uncertainty about themselves leads to 
social identification via self-stereotyping. Our model is in 
line with this assertion, but also suggests that uncertainty 
may not only reside in ourselves but also in our ingroups. 
Some groups provide little certainty on how to define the self 
in that social context (i.e., minimal, complex, diverse 
groups). In these groups, uncertainty may be reduced through 
self-anchoring. Indeed, in groups lacking clarity on their 
identity content, identification increases in response to self-
anchoring (Van Veelen et al., 2013b). Further research should 
focus on the interplay between uncertainty at the personal 
and the group levels in relation to cognitive mechanisms to 
explain identification in our integrative model.
Finally, in the SIMCA (van Zomeren et al., 2012), social 
identification is an important predictor for collective 
action. One might speculate that self-anchoring and self-
stereotyping have different consequences for the kind of 
collective action highly identifying group members engage 
in. With self-stereotyping, identification is based on assim-
ilation to shared ingroup norms. Hence, the kind of collec-
tive action may relate to preserving current group norms 
and status quo. In contrast, with self-anchoring, a group 
bond is based on projection of personal attributes. Perhaps 
those who highly identify via self-anchoring are more 
likely to initiate collective action to change the current 
group norms and status quo. This idea forms an interesting 
venue for further research.
Alternative Pathways
In the IMSI, a principle of meaning making serves as a basis 
for self-stereotyping and self-anchoring as cognitive 
pathways to social identification. This principle is also put 
forward in work on creative distinctiveness (Spears, Jetten, 
Scheepers, & Cihangir, 2009) to explain positive ingroup 
bias in minimal groups. Spears and colleagues argue that to 
positively evaluate a minimal ingroup, one seeks to define 
the meaningless ingroup based on differentiation with what 
“we are not” (the outgroup). This alternative explanation 
implies that the positive affect we feel toward our ingroups is 
highly dependent on the presence of an outgroup. In the 
IMSI, we take an intragroup perspective and argue that we 
do not necessarily need outgroups to attach positive signifi-
cance to our ingroups (see Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Oriña, 
2006; Otten, 2002, for similar views). Rather, social identifi-
cation can be explained based on the mere relationship 
between self and ingroup.
In line with cognition-based models of social inference 
(Dawes, 1990; DiDonato et al., 2011), the IMSI assumes that 
self-anchoring and self-stereotyping are cognitive processes 
of meaning making. Hence, group and individual moderators 
in the model focus on availability or applicability of self- and 
group information that allows for a cognitive meaning-mak-
ing process. Nevertheless, an interesting venue for future 
research could be to expand the IMSI to include motivational 
aspects as well (Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012; Machunsky, 
Toma, Yzerbyt, & Corneille, 2014). Currently, the model 
outlines that meaning making in groups may be resolved 
through social inference and result in higher identification. 
How self-anchoring and self-stereotyping might be driven by 
motivational needs is still unexplored. From the Optimal 
Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991), we know that 
belongingness needs are fulfilled through self-stereotyping. 
Work by Locke, Craig, Baik, and Gohil (2012) showed that 
high belongingness needs result in strong projection of per-
sonal preferences onto others. Moreover, in recent unpub-
lished data, we found that the need to belong was positively 
related to both self-anchoring and self-stereotyping (Van 
Veelen, Hansen, & Otten, 2015). This work forms a starting 
point to understand how motivations may enrich the IMSI.
The IMSI assumes that the level of self-anchoring and 
self-stereotyping can predict the level of social identifica-
tion. This assumption is supported by initial empirical evi-
dence (Van Veelen et al., 2014). At the same time, we do not 
wish to rule out the possibility for a reverse causal sequence. 
Particularly in the self-stereotyping literature, scholars would 
argue that when an ingroup identity is highly salient (Haslam, 
Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Spears et al., 1997) or 
threatened (Latrofa et al., 2010), high identifiers are particu-
larly motivated to self-define in terms of ingroup stereotypes. 
We agree that situational salience of an ingroup identity can 
temporarily increase the tendency to self-define as a stereo-
typical ingroup member. However, temporal in(ter)group 
salience does not explain how those high identifiers incorpo-
rated the ingroup as a part of the self-concept in the first 
place. IMSI focuses on a more stable, long-term process of 
identification rather than short-term changes in perceived 
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self-prototypicality in response to (inter)group events. 
Therefore, for the purposes of our model, the personal and 
social selves are positioned as cognitive building blocks to 
social identification. Our longitudinal study provided first 
evidence for this causal link (Van Veelen et al., 2014), but 
thus far, most studies are correlational and cross-sectional. It 
is therefore important to conduct more longitudinal and 
experimental studies to investigate the causal flow between 
self-anchoring, self-stereotyping, and social identification 
more thoroughly.
Our model may be highly relevant to understand fluctua-
tions in social identification levels in response to group iden-
tity changes over time. There is relatively little research 
about consequences of change in a group’s prototype for 
social identification. From the organizational literature we 
know that company mergers lead to a new overarching group 
identity in which some aspects remain, whereas others 
change (van Leeuwen, van Knippenberg, & Ellemers, 2003). 
Change is also studied in the context of schisms or the sepa-
ration of a subgroup, because the core of a group identity 
changes (Sani & Reicher, 2000). In essence, in a context of 
change, some group members’ identification levels rise, 
whereas others start to disidentify. To date, empirical studies 
on the intraindividual cognitive mechanisms that explain 
such changes are absent. For example, it is assumed that 
people disidentify because of a cognitive misfit between core 
aspects of the personal self and the group (J. C. Becker & 
Tausch, 2014). To test this, we believe that the IMSI may 
form a good basis.
Finally, we define social identification as a general con-
struct, focusing on the overall level of affective signifi-
cance people attach to their ingroup, without specifying 
between different subcomponents of identification (see also 
Cadinu, Latrofa, Carnaghi, 2013). IMSI is a complex model 
to understand antecedents of social identification, and it is 
applicable in many different types of groups. The utility of 
such complex model asks for a simple construct of social 
identification (e.g., Reysen, Katzarska-Miller, Nesbit, & 
Pierce, 2013). Indeed, most scholars define and operation-
alize social identification as a single construct for practical 
reasons, and/or because their hypotheses do not differenti-
ate between subcomponents (e.g., Latrofa et al., 2010; 
Riketta, 2005; Rockmann, Pratt, & Northcraft, 2007; Spears 
et al., 1997). Therefore, we consider a general construct of 
social identification as suitable and valid for the theoretical 
and practical purposes of IMSI. Nevertheless, in prior lit-
erature, several models demonstrated the multicomponent 
nature of social identification (Ashmore, Deaux, & 
McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Cameron, 2004; Leach et al., 
20089; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 
2008), differentiating, for example, between the importance 
to, satisfaction with, or loyalty to the group. In future 
research, the IMSI could be tested on the relevance of self-
anchoring and self-stereotyping on these specific subcom-
ponents of social identification.
Inclusive Intergroup Relations
Otten (2005) discussed possible consequences of self-anchor-
ing and self-stereotyping for the perceived variability in per-
ceptions of the ingroup’s identity. With self-anchoring, arguably 
there should be variability in ingroup judgments across group 
members (i.e., heterogeneity). In contrast, because self-stereo-
typing is based on the premise that a consensual ingroup proto-
type is available, this process should reflect relatively little 
intragroup variability (i.e., homogeneity) in ingroup judgments. 
Such difference in variability of a group’s identity representa-
tion may be highly relevant and consequential for how people 
cognitively adapt to an increasingly complex, diverse society, 
and how intergroup relations may be improved within diverse 
groups (Crisp & Meleady, 2012). Potentially, a shift from the 
social to the personal self in inferring a self–group relation in a 
diverse group increases people’s perceived level of complexity 
within a group identity (see also Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). 
Results from a recent study addressing this issue (Van Veelen, 
Otten, & Hansen, 2014) indeed reveal that self-anchoring leads 
to a more inclusive and tolerant perspective on group diversity, 
whereas self-stereotyping fosters similarity-based “us” and 
“them” thinking, and intergroup bias. So far, this research has 
been limited to laboratory groups, in which diversity was based 
on a single category dimension. We encourage future research 
to focus on more complex, multiple group categorizations 
(Crisp & Hewstone, 2007), and natural group settings such as 
multicultural societies (Verkuyten, 2005) or organizations (van 
Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004) to investigate how a 
cognitive bond with diverse groups can best be achieved.
Conclusion
The IMSI demonstrates that people’s level of social identifica-
tion is based on two cognitive mechanisms: self-stereotyping 
and self-anchoring. The model is grounded in empirical find-
ings and offers innovative theoretical and practical implica-
tions for future research. The core premise of the model is that 
the social and the personal self complement each other as cog-
nitive mechanisms fostering social identification. Integrating 
self-anchoring and self-stereotyping into one research model 
provides new theoretical insights into how people identify 
with groups. Finally, unraveling group and individual modera-
tors in our model allows for a dynamic understanding of why 
some do, and others do not identify, why people can belong to 
ingroups without necessarily conforming to group prototypes, 
and how people may cognitively adapt to an increasingly com-
plex and diverse social environment. This is a promising start. 
Research on the integrative role of self-anchoring and self-
stereotyping will hopefully flourish in the future.
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Notes
1. Importantly, self-anchoring can be seen as a specific infer-
ence process within the broader concept of social projection. 
Social projection (also called “egocentric perception,” “false 
consensus,” or “self-as-informational base”) denotes people’s 
tendency to project their own traits, attitudes, or behaviors 
onto other entities (e.g., groups, persons, or objects; e.g., 
Gramzow, Gaertner, & Sedikides, 2001; Krueger, 2007; Marks 
& Miller, 1987; Mullen, 1985; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). 
This more general inference process has been investigated in 
relation to interpersonal relations (e.g., Ames, 2004b), social 
dilemmas and negotiations (e.g., Acevedo & Krueger, 2005; 
Ames, 2004a; Ames, Weber, & Zou, 2012), and in(ter)group 
processes (e.g., Krueger & Zeiger, 1993; Mullen, Dovidio, 
Johnson, & Copper, 1992; Otten & Wentura, 2001; Robbins & 
Krueger, 2005; Spears & Manstead, 1990). Self-anchoring is 
a type of social projection that specifically denotes the self → 
ingroup relation. Therefore, we will use the term self-anchoring 
throughout this article.
2. In accordance with the Oxford dictionary, we define default as 
“an option that is selected automatically unless an alternative 
is specified.”
3. Ames (2004a and 2004b) also argued for a more egalitarian 
perspective on the role of self-knowledge and group knowl-
edge (i.e., stereotypes) when making social inferences. Yet, 
rather than focusing on self–ingroup overlap, this research 
specifically compared the use of self-knowledge and stereo-
types when making inferences about outgroup targets.
4. Considering that our primary goal is to focus on how people 
identify with ingroups, we limit the scope of Table 1 to mea-
sures of self-anchoring and self-stereotyping pertaining to the 
self–ingroup relation, and we do not focus on other forms of 
social inference.
5. This is why in Table 1, the content criterion for MGP studies 
using existing traits is not applicable (NA)
6. A disadvantage with implicit measures at the trait level is that 
they are not easily related to explicit measures at the individual 
level (Nosek, 2007). Indeed, first attempts to link self-anchor-
ing and self-stereotyping measures based on reaction time (RT) 
scores to an explicit measure of identification revealed no effects 
(Van Veelen, 2008). Some scholars have measured social identi-
fication at an implicit level (e.g., Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 
2002). However, implicit measures merely tap into an automatic 
association with the ingroup. They do not capture the concep-
tual richness of social identification as explicit measures do, as 
the latter include the affective significance and commitment that 
people attach to ingroups (Cadinu & Galdi, 2012). Therefore, we 
focus on explicit self-report measures of social identification.
7. Note, however, that only in the study by Latrofa, Vaes, Cadinu, 
and Carnaghi (2010), the impact of self-stereotyping on social 
identification was tested while controlling for self-anchoring. 
This was not the case for the studies in Latrofa, Vaes, Pastore, 
and Cadinu (2009) and Cadinu, Latrofa, & Carnaghi (2013), 
because stereotype-irrelevant traits were not included in the 
analyses (Latrofa et al., 2009), or the ingroup was made salient 
prior to self-ratings (Cadinu et al., 2013).
8. Importantly, minority or majority positions in a group can be 
attributed to different aspects of the subgroup relationship, 
for example, power over resources, status, numerical size, or 
a combination of these. We cite work on minority/majority 
positions focusing on several of such attributions. We assume, 
however, that our theoretical argument should be generaliz-
able, as long as there is salience and accessibility of asym-
metrical subgroup categories (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963).
9. Note that in their Self-Definition subscale, Leach et al. (2008) 
conceive of self-stereotyping (and ingroup homogeneity) as a 
part of social identification. However, we conceive of self-ste-
reotyping as a separate construct. Self-stereotyping refers to the 
process of cognitive overlap via assimilation to the group proto-
type, and social identification refers to a state of mind, reflecting 
the affective significance one attaches to ingroup membership 
(see also Cadinu, Latrofa, & Carnaghi, 2013; Postmes, Haslam, 
& Jans, 2013). Thus, although social identification and self-
stereotyping are closely related, with the incorporation of self-
anchoring in the Integrative Model of Social Identification 
(IMSI), it is clear that social identification is not inextricably 
linked to perceived prototypicality (or homogeneity).
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